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Abstract
■ Prevalent theories about consciousness propose a causal re-
lation between lack of spatial coding and absence of conscious
experience: The failure to code the position of an object is
assumed to prevent this object from entering consciousness.
This is consistent with influential theories of unilateral neglect
following brain damage, according to which spatial coding of
neglected stimuli is defective, and this would keep their process-
ing at the nonconscious level. Contrary to this view, we report
evidence showing that spatial coding and consciousness can
dissociate. A patient with left neglect, who was not aware of
contralesional stimuli, was able to process their color and po-
sition. However, in contrast to (ipsilesional) consciously per-
ceived stimuli, color and position of neglected stimuli were
processed separately. We propose that individual object fea-
tures, including position, can be processed without attention
and consciousness and that conscious perception of an ob-
ject depends on the binding of its features into an integrated
percept. ■
INTRODUCTION
Awareness of a stimulus can be defined as the explicit
knowledge of its physical and semantic properties or sim-
ply of its existence. This knowledge can be demonstrated
by direct reports of the perception of the stimulus; for
example, by naming it, categorizing it, or just by signaling
its presence. Contrary to common sense, several studies
have demonstrated that stimulus perception can occur
without awareness. Perception without awareness has
been shown in many studies with healthy participants by
means of procedures ensuring that the critical stimuli were
presented below the awareness threshold (see Merikle,
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001, for a review). However, the
clearest evidence of unconscious perception comes from
a number of brain-damaged patients who are impaired
in the conscious processing of certain stimuli but are
able to process them unconsciously. Striking examples of
this dissociation between preserved implicit (i.e., non-
conscious) and impaired explicit (i.e., conscious) process-
ing can be observed in unilateral neglect (UN).
UN is a neuropsychological disorder that usually follows
right parietal damage and results in the patientʼs failure to
orient attention toward the side of space contralateral to
the lesion (Mesulam, 1999; Heilman, Watson, & Valenstein,
1993). Although UN patients are unaware of contralesional
stimuli, implicit processing of several properties of these
stimuli has been shown with indirect measures (Berti,
2002; Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001), that is, by evaluating
the effects of processing of neglected stimuli on responses
to stimuli presented in the intact hemispace. Properties
that can be processed implicitly include color and shape,
identity of alphanumerical symbols, and even the mean-
ing of words and pictures (Della Sala, van der Meulen,
Bestelmeyer, & Logie, 2010; Làdavas, Paladini, & Cubelli,
1993; Berti & Rizzolatti, 1992; Marshall & Halligan, 1988).
For example, word–nonword judgments of letter strings
presented in the intact hemispace of UN patients were
found to be faster when these strings were semantically
related to words presented in the neglected hemispace
(Làdavas et al., 1993).
Studies that used indirect tasks provided compelling
evidence that, in UN, high-level stimulus processing can
occur in the absence of awareness. To account for this
counterintuitive dissociation, it has been proposed that
the lack of awareness for neglected stimuli reflects selec-
tive impairment in processing a critical stimulus feature,
that is, stimulus position. Indeed, one of the best-known
UN accounts considers it as a deficit of spatial representa-
tion and only secondarily as an attentional deficit (Bisiach,
1993): Patients would not try to attend to locations that
they are not able to represent. According to this account,
UN derives from damage to parietal areas involved in the
coding of space (the so-called dorsal or “where” system;
Milner & Goodale, 1995). In contrast, cortical areas con-
cerned with the recognition of objects through the analysis
of their constituent features (the ventral or “what” system)
would be relatively preserved (Berti, 2002). Several authors
have proposed that the impaired spatial processing of
contralesional stimuli by the dorsal system is what prevents1University of Trento, 2University of Padova, 3University of Edinburgh
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object representations produced in the ventral system
from entering consciousness (Berti, 2002; Berti & Rizzolatti,
1992).
This proposal implies that the encoding of stimulus
location is a necessary condition for conscious awareness
(Deouell, 2002; Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001): Without
spatial coding, a stimulus might be processed up to the
semantic level, but it is precluded from entering con-
sciousness. The proposal of a direct causal relationship
between lack of spatial coding and lack of conscious
awareness of neglected stimuli (i.e., the idea of the spatial
processing deficit as the only reason why otherwise well-
coded stimuli do not reach awareness) further implies that
spatial coding might be sufficient for constituent stimulus
features, when properly processed by the ventral system,
to access consciousness.
The fact that spatial processing per se (i.e., without
constituent feature processing) is not sufficient to bring
objects to awareness is suggested both by studies with nor-
mal participants (e.g., Treccani, Umiltà, & Tagliabue, 2006)
and by studies on other neuropsychological disorders. For
example, some patients with damage to the primary visual
cortex (V1) demonstrate a preserved ability to localize
visual stimuli that they deny seeing (the so-called “blind-
sight”; Cowey, 2010). Blindsight has often been described
as the converse of UN (e.g., Làdavas, Berti, & Farnè, 2000).
UN would result from the impairment of the localization
system in the face of a relatively intact analysis of the con-
stituent features of objects, whereas blindsight would re-
sult from relatively intact functioning of the localization
system, in spite of a damage to the system analyzing object
features, because of lesions of V1. In this latter case, stimu-
lus awareness would not arise because only objects can
access consciousness: Mere spatial codes (i.e., locations
without content; Paillard, Michel, & Stelmach, 1983) would
not give rise to conscious experiences.
Thus, to have a conscious experience of an event, one
would need to activate both space and object represen-
tations (e.g., Làdavas et al., 2000). However, losing the
ability to process a nonspatial stimulus feature, say stimu-
lus color, does not lead to the loss of stimulus awareness.
In contrast, when the representation of stimulus loca-
tion is lost or degraded, then awareness of other stimu-
lus properties and of the stimulus itself would also be
lost. Our internal representation of space would provide
the basic medium for conscious perceptual experience
(Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001), and when the represen-
tation of constituent properties of stimuli is intact, as
apparently happens to be the case with contralesional
stimuli in UN, the “where” might enable the awareness
of the “what” (Berti, 2002; see also the discussion about
allochiria below).
These considerations are in line with the prevalent idea
of a close relation between space and consciousness
(Campbell, 2002). Indeed, contents of consciousness have
often been described as laid out in space (Descartes, 1641/
1993) or as having a spatial structure (Bisiach, 1997); space
is considered to be an a priori representation, necessary
to know consciously the external world (Kant, 1781/1990).
Consistent with this idea and with the spatial coding ac-
count of UN, behavioral, electrophysiological, and neuro-
imaging measures have shown that processing of stimulus
position is considerably more impaired in the contralesional
than ipsilesional hemispace of UN patients (Deouell, 2002).
Results of studies using these measures also suggest that
spatial feature processing of contralesional stimuli is more
impaired than the processing of other features: Even when
a stimulus is seen or heard on the neglected side, its loca-
tion often remains uncertain (Robertson, 2004). For exam-
ple, studies using auditory stimuli (e.g., syllables or tones)
have shown that UN patients fail to localize left-side stimuli
(i.e., they are not able to report where the presented sound
comes from) even when they are able to identify these
stimuli (e.g., they are able to report whether a high- or
low-pitch tone has been presented; Pavani, Làdavas, &
Driver, 2002). However, given that, in these studies, spatial
coding has been tested with direct tasks explicitly requiring
patients to report stimulus position (Pavani et al., 2002;
Deouell & Soroker, 2000), preserved implicit spatial pro-
cessing cannot be ruled out. There is indeed evidence that
explicit and implicit spatial perception can dissociate in
brain-damaged patients (i.e., the same patients who show
an impairment in conscious spatial processing can be able
to process objectsʼ spatial features without being aware of
them; Robertson, 2004; Kim & Robertson, 2001), just as it
happens with explicit and implicit perception of objectsʼ
constituent (i.e., nonspatial) features.
Kristjánsson, Vuilleumier, Malhotra, Husain, and Driver
(2005) were the first to compare the processing of spa-
tial and nonspatial attributes of contralesional stimuli by
means of an indirect task. In Kristjánsson et al.ʼs study,
two UN patients performed a task in which, on each trial,
they had to find a uniquely colored target among a set of
three stimuli (i.e., three diamonds) and report whether it
had a notch cutoff. In the first experiment of this study,
Kristjánsson et al. used long target display times and found
that both patients showed considerable color and location
repetition priming effects: Responses were faster when
either target color or location was repeated across succes-
sive trials. For both types of priming effect (i.e., repeated
target location or color), the effects observed for ipsile-
sional and contralesional targets were comparable.
These findings suggest that, when tested with indirect
measures, UN patients may show considerable effects of
both spatial and nonspatial attributes of contralesional
stimuli and that spatial processing can also occur for
these stimuli. However, these results do not imply that ne-
glected stimuli are spatially processed. With long target
display times, indeed, the patients tested by Kristjánsson
et al. (2005) in Experiment 1 never failed to detect con-
tralesional targets, that is, contralesional targets were not
actually neglected but were consciously processed.
Kristjánsson et al. (2005) also tested the same two
patients in another experiment in which shorter display
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times were used. In this condition, patients often missed
contralesional targets. Results of this experiment revealed
a dissociation between color and location repetition
priming in the contralesional hemispace: Color priming
occurred regardless of whether the preceding target had
been consciously detected or escaped awareness, whereas
location priming only arose from preceding targets that
had been consciously detected (i.e., location of neglected
stimuli did not prime the response to subsequent stimuli).
Thus, results of this second experiment point to the exis-
tence of an association between location priming and
awareness.
Kristjánsson et al. (2005) used a task in which unseen
objects might affect patientsʼ judgments of objects pre-
sented afterward. However, to assess the possible indirect
effects (i.e., priming effects) of the neglected contralesional
stimulus presented in one trial, participants needed to
consciously detect the contralesional stimulus presented
in the following trial and emit an explicit response to it.
Priming effects were estimated on the basis of this re-
sponse. As in previous studies, therefore, in this case too,
patients were required to emit direct responses to contrale-
sional stimuli. Responses to these stimuli were obviously
defective (e.g., they were slower than responses to ipsile-
sional stimuli) and might not be the optimal measure to
evaluate implicit processing of stimulus spatial informa-
tion. Nevertheless, the results of this study represent the
most convincing evidence in support of the hypothesis
of mutual dependence between stimulus location process-
ing and stimulus awareness (i.e., one cannot spatially pro-
cess a stimulus without being or becoming aware of it),
which, in turn, is fully consistent with the idea of a rela-
tion between impairment of spatial processing and lack
of stimulus awareness in UN.
Other studies have compared spatial and nonspatial
feature processing in the two hemispaces by using non-
behavioral measures (i.e., electrophysiological measures),
which do not require the patient to emit overt responses
to the critical stimuli, thus being free from the problems
connected with the use of direct behavioral measures as
an index of implicit processing. For example, Deouell,
Bentin, and Soroker (2000) recorded the EEG responses
of a group of UN patients to the occurrence of auditory
stimuli (i.e., tones) that differed from the stimuli presented
before with reference to either a spatial dimension (i.e.,
the stimulus location) or a nonspatial dimension (i.e., the
pitch or duration of the stimulus). Changes of stimulus
location elicited larger responses when the deviant stim-
ulus was presented on the ipsilesional side than when it
was presented on the contralesional side. Differences be-
tween the two hemispaces were either smaller or absent
when the change concerned the tone pitch or duration,
thus indicating a greater impairment of contralesional
stimulus processing when stimulus location was involved
compared with when nonspatial dimensions were con-
cerned. Although Deouell et al. did not test awareness of
the presented stimuli, these data are in agreement with
behavioral results obtained with UN patients in auditory
tasks (e.g., Pavani et al., 2002) in suggesting a link between
impairment of spatial processing of contralesional stimuli
and lack of awareness of these stimuli.
Evidence in favor of this hypothesis also comes from
studies that used event-related EEG potentials and fMRI
to investigate the neural basis of conscious and uncon-
scious stimulus processing. These studies showed that vi-
sual areas in the ventral system can still be activated, to
some extent, by neglected stimuli. In contrast, activation
of cortical areas in the dorsal pathway was observed only
for consciously perceived stimuli (e.g., Rees et al., 2002;
Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Driver, Vuilleumier, Eimer, & Rees,
2001). Yet, results of these studies are just suggestive of
some link between dorsal stimulus processing and stimu-
lus awareness, but they do not provide direct evidence of a
spatial coding deficit in UN that selectively involves neglect
stimuli and underlies the lack of stimulus awareness.
Another phenomenon that has been interpreted as evi-
dence of the spatial coding accounts of both conscious-
ness and UN is allochiria (Obersteiner, 1882), that is, the
tendency of some UN patients to report stimuli on the
neglected side as being perceived on the ipsilesional side:
The patient may declare that a tap on his or her left hand
was actually on his or her right, the voice of a person may
be reported as being heard on the opposite side to that on
which the person is speaking, and objects presented on
the left side of the visual scene may be reported as having
been presented on the right side.
Allochiria would indicate that nonspatial features of
neglected stimuli are processed, whereas location is not,
and that spatial coding enables conscious perception
(Deouell, 2002; Deouell & Soroker, 2000; Làdavas et al.,
2000). Only when a spatial code, even if inaccurate, is at-
tributed to the (implicitly processed) neglected stimuli
(i.e., contralesional stimuli are coded as presented on the
ipsilesional side) can they access consciousness. Yet, not
even allochiria rules out the possibility that the actual posi-
tion of the contralesional (misplaced) stimuli is implicitly
processed. Indeed, the fact that the displacement of con-
tralesional stimuli toward the ipsilesional side usually
occurs to homologous (symmetrical) locations (Bisiach,
1993; Halligan, Marshall, & Wade, 1992; Obersteiner, 1882)
suggests that the position of these stimuli in the contra-
lesional hemispace is actually coded. However, such a code
(i.e., the veridical position of contralesional stimuli) is
apparently discarded, and these stimuli are attributed to
contralateral positions in the ipsilesional hemispace.
The symmetrical stimulus displacement shown by some
UN patients with allochiria may indeed seem inconsistent
with the idea of spatial coding deficits in UN: Clearly, these
patients correctly identify the stimulus position within the
contralesional hemispace. However, this phenomenon is
reconcilable with spatial coding accounts if one considers
that space is not a unitary whole, that is, there exist multi-
ple spatial maps (cf. Robertson, 2004). Spatial coding defi-
cits in UN would not necessarily affect all the spatial maps.
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In the case of the typical manifestation of UN (with or with-
out allochiria), such spatial deficits would specifically in-
volve the horizontal plane, that is, the coding of stimulus
position on the left–right axis with reference to the body
midline (rather than the stimulus spatial coding within
one hemispace). Following right cerebral lesions, what
would be impaired is the attribution of a “left” spatial code
to contralesional stimuli.
Thus, there is no definitive evidence for a selective
deficit of stimulus spatial coding of neglected stimuli, at
least as far as implicit spatial processing is concerned, and
for a causal link between this deficit and lack of aware-
ness. There are several indications of the existence of this
link, but all of them can be interpreted otherwise. The
aim of our study was to examine the relation between
space processing and conscious awareness by testing a
UN patient with an indirect task that has been shown to
be diagnostic of the spatial nature of representations, re-
gardless of whether they are explicitly or implicitly pro-
cessed (i.e., a Simon-like task; Treccani et al., 2006). As in
Kristjánsson et al.ʼs (2005) study, the very same task tested
the effect of the processing of both spatial and nonspatial
stimulus attributes (i.e., stimulus position and color). The
task thus provided us with an independent measure of
implicit stimulus processing other than the critical one
and allowed possible dissociations between the two types
of processing (i.e., spatial and nonspatial) to emerge. In
contrast with previous studies, however, task performance
could be only indirectly affected by processing of stimuli
presented in either the intact or neglected hemispaces,
thus providing a highly sensitive measure of implicit stim-
ulus processing. No direct responses to either contra-
lesional or ipsilesional stimuli were indeed required: The
patient was asked to judge the color of a centrally pre-
sented square. This square was flanked by another square
that was task-irrelevant and was of the same color as the
target square (color-congruent condition), of the alter-
native target color (color-incongruent condition), or of
a color different from that of the possible targets (color-
neutral condition). The patient responded by pressing
a left- or right-side button: the button on the same side
as the flanker (spatially corresponding condition) or the
button on the opposite side (spatially noncorresponding
condition).
We tested the effects of both flanker position and color
on the speed and accuracy of target-color judgments.
These two effects are commonly observed with normal
participants in tasks that analyze these effects in isola-
tion: tasks in which the lateralized irrelevant stimulus
accompanying the central target (i.e., the flanker) is of
task-neutral color (Treccani et al., 2006) or tasks in which
the central target is flanked by two symmetrical stimuli (i.e.,
left and right sides) of a task-relevant color (Cohen &
Shoup, 1997). In the former type of tasks, responses are
usually faster in flanker–response spatially corresponding
trials (e.g., when a right button press is required in the
presence of a right-side flanker) than in noncorresponding
trials (i.e., the so-called accessory stimulus Simon effect;
Simon & Small, 1969). In the latter type of tasks, responses
are faster in the target–flanker color-congruent trials (e.g.,
when a red target is accompanied by red flankers) than in
color-incongruent trials (i.e., the so-called Eriksen flanker
effect; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). These two effects are
attributed to either attribute (i.e., color or position) of
the flanker(s) being coded, although task-irrelevant, and
automatically activating the associated response. In the
accessory stimulus Simon tasks, the flanker activates the
spatially corresponding response (e.g., the right button
press if the flanker is on the right). In the Eriksen flanker
tasks, the flankers activate the response associated to their
color on the basis of the task instructions (e.g., if red
targets required right button presses, red flankers also
activate the response on the right). When the response
activated by the flanker (irrelevant) attribute is the correct
one, it is quickly selected. In contrast, when the response
signaled by the flanker attribute is the wrong response,
the competition between this response and the required
one slows RTs.
The joint effect of flanker position and color had been
previously investigated with normal participants in a study
using the same task as that administered here (Treccani,
Cubelli, Della Sala, & Umiltà, 2009). Consistent with the
most widely accepted theories of compatibility phenom-
ena, this study showed an interactive effect of target–
flanker color congruency and flanker–response spatial cor-
respondence: What mattered most for performance was
not whether the response signaled by either flanker attri-
bute was the required response but rather whether the re-
sponses signaled by the two flanker attributes corresponded
or did not corresponded. This task, therefore, would allow
us not only to test whether flankers were spatially coded but
also to examine the interaction of the possible spatial and
color codes (i.e., the combined effect of the two flanker
features) in either the neglected or intact hemispace.
The evaluation of the way in which different stimulus
features interact in the neglected hemispace was interest-
ing in itself. Indeed, it has been suggested that feature
binding might be defective in the neglected hemispace
and the effects of conjunction of contralesional stimulus
features might not be observed even when individual
features are properly processed (Van Vleet & Robertson,
2009). Accordingly, the lack of contralesional stimulus
awareness in UN might result, not so much from a spatial
processing impairment, as from binding deficits: It might
be difficult or even impossible for unbound object fea-
tures to access consciousness, as people may only become
aware of integrated and unitary objects (Treisman & Gelade,
1980).
In fact, stimulus spatial coding and feature binding are
usually seen as inseparable processes, and the distinction
between them might seem immaterial: Individual stimu-
lus features would be bound together because they share
the same position, and the lack of spatial coding would
also prevent feature binding (e.g., Deouell, 2002). Yet,
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there is evidence that these processes can dissociate
in some brain-damaged patients, that is, patients with
Balintʼs syndrome (Robertson, 2004). Balintʼs syndrome
is a severe neuropsychological disorder that usually re-
sults from a bilateral damage to the parietal cortex. Pa-
tients with this condition can perceive only one object
in the visual scene at any given moment. In addition, they
are unable to report the location of the perceived object.
Despite these explicit spatial problems, there is evidence
of intact implicit spatial processing in Balint patients (Kim
& Robertson, 2001). This spared implicit spatial represen-
tation, however, does not seem to be sufficient to sustain
appropriate binding of the different features and items in
the visual scene. Features such as color, shape, motion,
and size seem to be randomly combined in the objects
perceived by Balint patients, and these patients fre-
quently misattribute the features of one object to another
(i.e., they form false feature conjunctions; e.g., they may
report a red X and a blue O as a red O and a blue X).
In Balint patients, improper binding (rather than a
complete lack of it) is observed for objects that are con-
sciously perceived (although only one at a time). The
possible indirect effects of the feature binding of objects,
when the observer is completely unaware of the pres-
ence of these objects, have not yet been investigated.
The task administered here might then be the optimal
tool to investigate this issue.
Our patient also performed a direct task that allowed us
to test her awareness of flankers: a flanker detection task.
In each trial of this task, the patient was required to report
whether the flanker stimulus had been presented. The
absence of explicit perception of contralesional flankers
shown in this task (i.e., the “zero-awareness” criterion;
Merikle et al., 2001) allowed us to attribute unequivocally
their effects on target-color judgment to the implicit pro-
cessing of their attributes.
METHODS
Participants
Six patients were selected from a pool of right-brain-
damaged patients whom we examined during the period
from October 2008 to May 2009. Patients were selected
if their lesions were confined to the right hemisphere
and if they were able to perform the experimental tasks
(e.g., they understood the instructions and were able to
perform the required responses). All patients were given
the conventional subtests of the Behavioral Inattention
Test (BIT; Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987). To be
selected, patients also needed to show signs of space-
based neglect—as opposed to object-based neglect—in
the BIT copying and drawing tasks: When requested to
copy multiple figures (i.e., the three horizontally aligned
geometrical shapes in the BIT shape copying subtest),
the selected patients copied only the central and right-
side (contralesional) figures and neglected the figure
on the left, rather than neglecting the contralesional
side of the individual figures. Spontaneous drawings also
suggested that the frame of reference of their deficit was
centered on their body midline rather than on external
objects.
Only one patient (V.M.) met an additional critical crite-
rion, that is, an ipsilesional/contralesional detection ratio
greater than 10:1 in a version of the flanker detection task
administered before the experimental sessions. This task
was identical to the control task of the experimental phase
(see below) and was administered immediately after the
patientʼs neuropsychological examination (i.e., 1 day be-
fore the first experimental session). In this task, the pa-
tient showed a clear-cut dissociation between the flanker
detection performances in the two hemispaces: V.M. de-
tected the 94% of right flankers and none of left flankers.
V.M. is a right-handed woman, with 15 years of edu-
cation, who, at the time of testing, was 58 years old. She
suffered from an ischemic stroke (documented by CT
scan; see Figure 1) confined to part of the territory of
the right middle cerebral artery centered on the superior
temporal gyrus and encroaching upon the right BG, re-
sulting in a severe left UN, left hemiparesis, and inferior
limb hypertonia.
No impairment of her visual field was detected with a
neurological examination at the time of testing. V.M.ʼs
visual field integrity was assessed clinically with the visual
confrontation technique proposed by Bisiach, Cappa, and
Vallar (1983) for the examination of UN patients. The pa-
tient was sitting on a chair against a wall of the testing
room (i.e., the patientʼs shoulder contralateral to the to-
be-examined hemifield faced the wall). When testing the
left hemifield, this procedure prevented attention from
Figure 1. Axial slices showing in red the extent of V.M.ʼs lesion (lesion reconstruction based on CT scan). Note that right in the figure indicates
the right side of the brain.
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remaining anchored to objects on the right and forced the
patient to orient attention to the left. The examiner was in
front of the patient who was asked to stare at the examinerʼs
nose. The patientʼs task was to detect movements of the
examinerʼs index finger. Ten stimuli (i.e., movements of
either the left or right index) were given briefly by the
examiner, in each of the two visual hemifields. V.M.ʼs per-
formance was at ceiling (10/10 detections) in the right
visual field, and she missed only two stimuli on the
left (8/10).
Therefore, V.M. did not show clinical signs of hemianopia,
whereas her behavior, as well as the neuropsychological
assessment, revealed a severe UN. Neuropsychological eval-
uation, as well as the first session of the experimental in-
vestigation, was carried out 43 days from the onset of the
lesion. The Verbal Judgements Test (Spinnler & Tognoni,
1987) was used to evaluate V.M.ʼs global cognitive level.
This is a verbal intelligence test consisting four subtests: dif-
ferences, proverbs, nonsensical stories, and classifications.
In it, the patient scored within normal limits. V.M. also ob-
tained normal scores in the Mini-Mental State Examination
(Measso et al., 1993) as well as in tests of executive func-
tions, language, and verbalmemory. In contrast, she showed
pathological scores in almost all the subtests of the BIT. The
patient also scored below the cutoff in a visuospatial mem-
ory test (i.e., Corsi Span, Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987). Her
impaired performance in this test was attributable to the
severe UN. V.M.ʼs scores in all the administered neuro-
psychological tests are presented in Table 1.
Materials and Procedure
V.M. underwent two experimental sessions that were run
on 2 days, with an interval of 2 weeks between them,
using E-Prime (Version 1.1.4.1) software (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Each experimental session
constituted two tasks.
Target-color Judgment Task
The stimuli and sequence of the events of each trial are
depicted in Figure 2.
Trials began with the presentation of a central 0.8° ×
0.8° white fixation cross. The patient was instructed to
keep her eyes on it. An acoustic 800-Hz warning tone
was delivered at the onset of fixation. At the offset of fixa-
tion, the target and flanker stimuli (i.e., 1.9° × 1.9° colored
squares) appeared. The target was shown at the center of
the screen and could be either green or red. The flanker
was presented on either the left or right of the target (the
center of the flanker was vertically aligned with fixation,
5.7° to the left or right) and could be red, green, or blue
(Session 1) or only blue (Session 2). The target and flanker
remained on the screen until the response was made or
for a maximum of 350 msec. Offset of target and flanker
was followed by a blank interval, which lasted until the
response or the time granted for responding (1500 msec)
elapsed. The patient was instructed to press one of the
two buttons of the mouse according to the target color
(i.e., the button on the left in response to the red targets
and the button on the right in response to the green tar-
gets). Both responses with the wrong button and the lack
of a response within the 1500 msec given for responding
were counted as errors. In either case, a 400-Hz auditory
error feedback was given during the blank, immediately
after the response or after the response time was elapsed.
Afterwards, a prompt to begin the next trial was presented.
As soon as the patient declared that she was ready to
continue, the next trial began.
Color-neutral (blue) flankers served as filler stimuli in
Session 1 and were not included in the analyses. In con-
trast, all the flankers were blue in Session 2, which was
aimed at investigating the effect of flanker–response spa-
tial correspondence in isolation (i.e., without this effect
being confounded with that of the target–flanker color
congruency). Previous studies conducted with normal
participants (e.g., Treccani et al., 2009) suggest that spatial
correspondence effects do not show up in trials wherein
the flanker color is neutral in terms of response assignment
when they are intermixed with trials in which the flanker is
of a task-relevant color (congruent and incongruent).
The patient responded by pressing the two buttons of
a computer mouse with the index and middle fingers of
her right hand. The mouse was placed inside a wooden
box, which was located on the right of the patient and
oriented so that the mouse was secured either to the
“floor” of the box, in the standard position (i.e., its but-
tons were upward), or to the “ceiling” of the box, upside
down (i.e., buttons were downward). In this latter case, the
mouse buttons were pressed with upward movements of
the fingers, instead of the usual downward movements
(see Figure 3). When the mouse was in the standard posi-
tion, the index finger was on the left of the middle finger,
whereas when the mouse was upside down, it was operat-
ing by placing the hand so that the palm faced the boxʼs
ceiling, and the index finger was on the right of the mid-
dle finger. Eye movements were monitored by an experi-
menterʼs assistant (e.g., Van Vleet & Robertson, 2009)
using a mirror. Trials during which eye movements were
detected were excluded from the analyses (5.8% and
3.4% in Sessions 1 and 2, respectively).
In both sessions, there were 384 randomly mixed trials.
They were divided into four blocks and equally distributed
across the possible types of trial: 12 (2 target colors ×
3 flanker colors × 2 flanker positions) in Session 1 and
4 (2 target colors × 2 flanker positions) in Session 2. In
each session, the patient performed the first two blocks
with the mouse in the standard position and the remain-
ing blocks with the mouse in the upside-down position,
thus pressing the left and right mouse buttons first with
the index and middle fingers and then with the middle
and index fingers. Therefore, both left and right responses
(i.e., responses to red and green targets) were made by
using (in an equal number of trials) the two fingers, that
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Table 1. Neuropsychological Evaluation of V.M.
Neuropsychological Test V.M.ʼs Score Range Cutoff
Global Cognitive Level
Verbal Judgments Test (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) 44.25 0–60 >32
Mini-Mental State Examination (Measso et al., 1993) 26.31 0–30 >24
Executive Functions
Weigl Sorting Test (Laiacona, Inzaghi, De Tanti, & Capitani, 2000) 11.82 0–15 >8
Cognitive Estimation Task (Della Sala, MacPherson, Phillips, Sacco, & Spinnler, 2003) 13.20 0–21 <18
Language
Semantic Verbal Fluency (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) 53 0–∞ >7
Letter Verbal Fluency (Novelli, Papagno, Capitani, Laiacona, Vallar, et al., 1986) 31 0–∞ >16
Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1983) 48 0–60 >34
Memory
Spatial Span (Corsi Test; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) 3a 0–10 >3.5
Verbal Span (Digit Span; Orsini et al., 1987) 7 0–9 >3.5
Paired-associate Learning (Novelli, Papagno, Capitani, Laiacona, Cappa, et al., 1986) 20.5 0–22.5 >6
Neglect
BIT (Wilson et al., 1987)
Conventional subtests
Total 79a 0–146 >129
Line crossing 35 0–36 >34
Letter cancellation 15a 0–40 >32
Star cancellation 26a 0–54 >51
Shape and figure copying 0a 0–4 >3
Line bisection 0a 0–9 >7
Behavioral subtests
Total 31a 0–81 >67
Picture scanning 6a 0–9 >6
Telephone dialing 4a 0–9 >8
Menu reading 6a 0–9 >6
Article reading 5a 0–9 >6
Telling and setting the time 3a 0–9 >7
Coin sorting 0a 0–9 >7
Address and sentence copying 3a 0–9 >7
Map navigation 3a 0–9 >6
Card sorting 1a 0–9 >7
Scores are corrected for age and level of education, when appropriate.
aPathological scores (i.e., scores under or above the cutoff point).
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is, the finger used for responding was balanced within each
response-position condition. Thus, response position did
not coincide (was not confounded) with the identity of
the response finger, and possible differences in response
speed between the two fingers could not mask the effects
under investigation (i.e., the spatial correspondence effect
in the two hemispaces).
Flanker Detection Task
This task was performed immediately after the color judg-
ment task in both sessions. Stimuli and procedure were
the same as in the previous task, but the flanker was not
always presented, and V.M. had to say whether one or
two stimuli were displayed. Patientʼs responses were en-
tered by the experimenter. V.M. was allowed to correct
herself, giving another response when she felt the first
one was wrong. The next trial began only when she was
sure about her response. There were 162 randomly mixed
trials divided into three blocks. Among these, 108 pre-
sented both target and flanker stimuli and were equally dis-
tributed across the possible types of target + flanker trials
(12 in Session 1 and 4 in Session 2), whereas 54 presented
the target alone (27 trials for each target color condition).
Figure 3. Target-color
judgment task. Standard (A) and
upside-down (B) arrangements
of the response device. When
the computer mouse was upside
down (B), the back of the hand
rested on a small cushion that
was placed on the boxʼs floor.
The cushion was removed
before taking this photograph
to better show the mouse and
hand placements.
Figure 2. Target-color judgment task. Schematic representation of the stimuli and sequence of the events of each trial.
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RESULTS
In the flanker detection tasks, the patient detected 93%
and 94% of right flankers (in Sessions 1 and 2, respec-
tively) and none of left flankers (in either session). Her
performance in the left-flanker condition was comparable
to that observed in the no-flanker condition: In both
cases, she always reported that only the central square
had been presented. In spite of her lack of awareness
of the contralesional flankers, these flankers, like the
right ones, had an effect in the target-color judgment
tasks of both sessions (see Figure 4 and Table 2).
Distributions of correct RTs in the target-color judgment
task of Session 1 were calculated for each level of the three
independent variables: Flanker Side (left and right), Con-
gruency between the target and flanker colors (congruent
and incongruent), and Spatial Correspondence between
position of the flanker and position of the required re-
sponse (corresponding and noncorresponding). These
distributions were divided into five 20% bins (De Jong,
Liang, & Lauber, 1994) and submitted to an ANCOVA with
these variables as between-item factors. Bin (1st–5th) was
included in the ANCOVA as covariate to control for the
possible variation in time of the Color Congruency and
Spatial Correspondence effects (Treccani et al., 2009). The
analysis revealed main effects of both Color Congruency,
F(1, 202) = 4.34, p < .05, and Spatial Correspondence,
F(1, 202) = 7.25, p < .01: Responses were faster in color-
congruent (695 msec) than color-incongruent (725 msec)
trials and in spatially corresponding (689 msec) than
noncorresponding (730 msec) trials.
The interaction between Spatial Correspondence and
Flanker Side was also significant, F(1, 202) = 10.16, p <
.01: Spatially corresponding versus noncorresponding RTs
were 668 versus 750 msec with left flankers and 710 versus
712 msec with right flankers (i.e., a spatially corresponding
trial advantage of 82 msec was found with left flankers,
whereas the difference between corresponding and non-
correponding RTs was only of 2 msec with right flankers).
In contrast, the Color Congruency effect was notmodulated
by the flanker position (i.e., the color-congruent trial ad-
vantage in the left and right hemispaces was of 25 and
37 msec, respectively). Finally, there was a significant inter-
action betweenColor Congruency, Spatial Correspondence,
and Flanker Side, F(1, 202)=8.79,p< .005. Additional com-
parisons showed that Color Congruency modulated the
Figure 4. Target-color judgment task: Session 1. Means (±SEMs) of correct RTs as a function of flanker side (left and right), target–flanker
color congruency (congruent and incongruent), and flanker–response spatial correspondence (corresponding and noncorresponding). Below
the x axes of the two graphs, schematic representations of the stimulus display are presented for every condition.
Table 2. Target-color Judgment Task: Session 2
Flanker Side Spatial Correspondence RT PE
Left Corresponding trials 681 (19.3) 1.1%
Noncorresponding trials 709 (19.9) 5.6%
Right Corresponding trials 665 (18.8) 1.0%
Noncorresponding trials 688 (19.4) 5.3%
Means (and SEMs) of correct RTs and percentages of errors (PEs) as a
function of flanker side and flanker–response spatial correspondence.
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Spatial Correspondence effect (i.e., spatially corresponding
responses were faster than spatially noncorresponding re-
sponses when the target and flanker colors were congruent,
whereas the reverse occurred when the target and flanker
colors were incongruent) but only with right flankers, F(1,
202)= 9.87, p< .005. The Color Congruency× Spatial Cor-
respondence interactive contrast performed on left-flanker
trials was not significant, F(1, 202) = 1.22, p = .27. Spa-
tially corresponding versus noncorresponding differences
were significant for both color-congruent, F(1, 202) =
4.35, p < .05, and color-incongruent trials, F(1, 202) =
13.32, p < .001, of left-flanker conditions, as well as for
color-congruent, F(1, 202) = 3.91, p < .05, and color-
incongruent trials, F(1, 202) = 6.06, p< .05, of right-flanker
conditions. Overall, the error rate was 11.7%. Seventy-one
percent (71%) of the errors were wrong button presses,
and the remaining 29% were omissions (i.e., the lack of a
response during the 1500 msec granted for responding).
Spatially corresponding versus noncorresponding error per-
centages were 13.8% versus 13.8% and 7.4% versus 16.7% in
the color-congruent and -incongruent trials of left-flanker
conditions, whereas they were 12.5% versus 6.7% and
13.3% versus 0% in the color-congruent and -incongruent
trials of right-flanker conditions. None of these correspond-
ing versus noncorresponding differences were significant
(Yates-corrected chi-squares, all ps ≥ .13).
Data from the target-color judgment task of Session 2
underwent the same analysis, with only the exclusion of
the Color Congruency variable. The ANCOVA only revealed
the significant main effect of Spatial Correspondence, F(1,
354) = 6.50, p < .05. Regardless of the side on which the
flanker was presented, spatially corresponding responses
were faster than noncorresponding responses (673 vs.
698 msec). The error percentage was also lower in corre-
sponding than noncorresponding trials with both left and
right flankers, but neither of these differences was signifi-
cant (Yates-corrected chi-squares, both ps ≥ .20). On the
whole, the error rate was very low (2.4%), and all the errors
were wrong button presses.
Results of ANCOVAs were confirmed by nonparametrical
tests, that is, permutation analyses (Monte Carlo Con-
strained Synchronized Permutation Test [CSPT]: Basso,
Chiarandini, & Salmaso, 2007). Given that only two vari-
ables can be introduced in each permutation analysis,
RTs from Session 1 were first analyzed through separate
CSPTs for the two flanker positions, with spatial correspon-
dence and bin as factors (the same factors were considered
in the subsequent analyses). In both analyses, for each
factor, we computed the test statistic (T) from the ob-
served data. This allowed us to test the main effect of each
factor. We compared the observed value of T with its null
distribution, which was obtained through (5000) synchro-
nized permutations, that is, by exchanging the same (ran-
dom) number of observations (RTs) between each pair of
levels of the factor under testing, within the same level of
the other factor. The exchanged observations were in the
same original position. We then computed the p value for
each test statistic, that is, the probability, based on the T
null distribution, to obtain a T value equal to or greater
than the observed one. The spatial correspondence effect
was significant for left flanker ( p < .0001), whereas it was
far from significance for right flankers ( p = .67). Data
obtained in right-flanker trials were then further analyzed
through two separate CSPTs for the two color congruency
conditions. Both the spatially corresponding response ad-
vantage in color-congruent trials and the noncorrespond-
ing response advantage in color-incongruent trials were
significant (both ps < .05). RTs from Session 2 were ana-
lyzed through separate CSPTs for the two flanker posi-
tions. The spatial correspondence effect was significant in
both left- and right-flanker trials (both ps < .05).
DISCUSSION
The results reported here indicate strong effects of both
the flanker color and the flanker position on V.M.ʼs per-
formance. In the target-color judgment task of Session 1,
V.M. showed color congruency effects with both left and
right flankers, confirming that the color (i.e., a nonspatial
attribute) can be processed and engage response-related
mechanisms in either neglected or intact hemispace (e.g.,
Kristjánsson et al., 2005; Danckert, Maruff, Kinsella, de
Graaff, & Currie, 1999). Notably, a spatial correspondence
effect was also observed in the neglected hemispace, which
shows that the position of neglected stimuli can be pro-
cessed as well. This is the first demonstration that, in UN,
not only constituent features but also spatial attributes of
contralesional (nonconsciously perceived) stimuli can be
properly coded (cf. McIntosh et al., 20041). It undermines
both the widely shared assumption that UN is essentially
a deficit in the spatial representation of contralesional stim-
uli (Bisiach, 1993) and the idea that such a deficit causes
the loss of awareness of these stimuli (Berti & Rizzolatti,
1992). V.M. showed a dramatic impairment in responding
overtly to left flankers, yet her (covert) spatial coding of
these stimuli was as effective as the coding of right flankers:
The spatial correspondence effects observed with left flank-
ers were comparable in size to both the standard and re-
verse correspondence effects observed with right flankers.
This finding was confirmed in Session 2, where the spatial
correspondence effect could not be modulated by color
congruency, and a standard effect of about 25 msec was
found in either hemispace. Therefore, the hypothesis that
spatial representation of contralesional stimuli is partially
preserved in UN patients but is not good enough to sup-
port conscious awareness (cf. Robertson, 2004) does not
seem likely either: The coding of lateral stimuli with respect
to the body position and/or with respect to the focus of
attention (i.e., the spatial coding underlying the spatial cor-
respondence effects observed in the target-color judgment
task) seems to have been equally effective in both the left
and right hemispaces of V.M.
In fact, these results cannot rule out that other types of
(implicit) spatial coding or spatial representations serving
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computational needs different from those involved in
the tasks administered here (cf. Milner & Goodale, 1995)
were defective in the neglected hemispace (e.g., a more
finely tuned spatial representation entailing the coding of
spatial relations between objects within this hemispace).
However, the left versus right coding that V.M. was able
to perform (cf. Treccani et al., 2009) is exactly the type of
coding the lack of which is considered by the spatial ac-
count as underlying the lack of contralesional stimulus
awareness in UN patients and the stimulus misallocation
in those patients who show allochiria. As previously under-
lined, spatial deficits in UN are not supposed to affect nec-
essarily all the spatial maps. For example, patients might
still be able to code the position of an object within the
contralesional hemispace, as shown by some patients with
allochiria. The spatial deficit would specifically affect the
representation of the stimulus on the left–right axis. This
is not clearly the case with the UN patient evaluated in
the present study. Therefore, V.M.ʼs performance is more
consistent with an alternative account of UN, according to
which contralesional space representation is intact, but at-
tention-orienting mechanisms are not, so that attention
cannot be allocated toward the contralesional side of space
representation (Mesulam, 1999; Heilman et al., 1993).
These findings do not obviously rule out that some UN
patients have an actual deficit in the left–right spatial cod-
ing of objects when they appear on the contralesional side:
UN patients are indeed a heterogeneous group. However,
these results clearly demonstrate that, at (the very) least,
this problem does not concern all the patients showing
UN and that the overt neglect of implicitly processed stim-
uli cannot be univocally attributed to the lack of spatial
coding. It has been conjectured that at least some UN
patients may encode the locations of the stimuli, the con-
stituent features of which they show they can process im-
plicitly (e.g., Robertson, 2004). The present results provide
empirical evidence for this conjecture.
More generally, the present findings indicate that both
spatial and nonspatial stimulus information can be en-
coded, and associated responses can be activated, without
the stimulus entering consciousness and even when atten-
tion is oriented elsewhere. Therefore, contrary to widely ac-
cepted views (Berti, 2002; Campbell, 2002; Berti &Rizzolatti,
1992), the processing of either type of information (the one
processed by the dorsal pathway and that processed by the
ventral pathway) does not seem to be decisive in bringing
a stimulus to consciousness. Even if spatial coding of visual
stimuli might be necessary for conscious perception (Berti
& Rizzolatti, 1992), it is certainly not sufficient. Furthermore,
spatial coding of neglected (i.e., unattended) stimuli poses
a serious challenge to theories maintaining that spatial
codes of stimuli producing spatial correspondence effects
derive from shifts of attention toward these stimuli (Umiltà
& Nicoletti, 1992; Umiltà & Liotti, 1987). The present find-
ings are better accounted for by hypotheses that do not
posit a crucial role of attention movements for the gen-
eration of spatial correspondence effects: the accounts
postulating that the stimulus position (here, flanker posi-
tion) is codedwith respect to a salient reference object (here,
the central target; e.g., Hommel, 1993) or those theories
that keep the idea of attention as critical for the spatial
code to be generated but do not maintain that attention
has to be oriented toward a stimulus in order for this
stimulus to be spatially coded (i.e., they simply state that
the stimulus is spatially coded with respect to the posi-
tion of the focus of attention at the time the stimulus is
presented—here, again, the center of the screen, where
the target appeared; e.g., Stoffer, 1991). This latter account,
in particular, is also consistent with results obtained with
other tasks providing for the presentation of lateralized ac-
cessory stimuli that accompanied central targets: Unlike with
the study described here, attention has been shown to be
critical for spatial correspondence effects to occur in previous
studies with healthy participants that used accessory stimulus
tasks, irrespective of whether the accessory stimulus was
perceived with or without awareness (Treccani et al., 2006).
The dissociation between spatial coding and both atten-
tion and consciousness observed in the present study leaves
open the questions of exactly when attention intervenes and
what allows stimuli to be consciously perceived. A cue
comes from the qualitatively different pattern of results we
observed for right and left flankers in Session 1: interactive
and additive effects of spatial correspondence and color
congruency, respectively. On the one hand, this difference
provides further evidence for the patientʼs lack of aware-
ness of left flankers. Indeed, according to several authors
(McCormick, 1997; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996;
Dixon, 1971), the observation of effects of the critical stim-
ulus feature in an indirect task (in our study, the target-color
judgment task) and the failure to detect the stimulus in a
forced-choice task (here, the flanker detection task) are
not enough to demonstrate perception without aware-
ness. An additional criterion is necessary, which consists in
demonstrating qualitatively different behavioral effects
under conditions of conscious and nonconscious percep-
tion. More importantly, the qualitative difference between
the effects of flankers in the two hemispaces may shed light
on theway stimuli are processedwith andwithout attention.
The interactive effect of color congruency and spatial cor-
respondence observed in the intact hemispace was the
expected finding for attended and consciously perceived
flankers: It replicates results obtained with normal partici-
pants (e.g., Treccani et al., 2009, Experiment 1). Previous
studies suggest that spatially corresponding trials of color-
congruent conditions and noncorresponding trials of the
incongruent conditions are advantaged because, in both
cases, the flanker color and position activate the same re-
sponse, which is quickly selected when it is the correct re-
sponse (i.e., in corresponding-congruent trials) or quickly
aborted when it is the wrong one (i.e., in noncorresponding-
incongruent trials). When the flanker color and position
prime two different responses (i.e., in noncorresponding-
congruent or corresponding-incongruent trials), a conflict
takes place between the two responses that cannot be
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rapidly solved, and this slows RTs. In contrast, when the
flanker color does not belong to the target set (as in
Session 2), the flanker would activate only the spatially
corresponding response, speeding it up when it is the cor-
rect one. In this case, the spatial correspondence effect
would not be masked by the effect of color congruency
(see Treccani et al., 2009, Experiment 2). Thus, V.M.ʼs
performance in the target-judgment task was comparable
with that of normal participants and consistent with cur-
rent hypotheses about the cognitive mechanisms underly-
ing compatibility phenomena, either when the flanker
varied with reference to only one attribute (i.e., its posi-
tion in Session 2), irrespective of the hemispace in which
it was presented, or when the flanker varied with ref-
erence to two task-relevant attributes (i.e., color and posi-
tion in Session 1), as long as it was presented in the intact
hemispace.
In other words, in the intact, attended hemispace, V.M.
showed regular trends of compatibility effects for (con-
sciously perceived) flankers characterized by either one
or two attributes, whereas in the neglect hemispace, she
showed a regular trend only when the (nonconsciously
perceived) flankers varied according to one attribute.
With two flanker attributes, we observed a different pat-
tern from that found either in normal participants or in
the intact hemispace of the patient herself, that is, no
modulation of the effect of one flanker attribute by the
other attribute.
Previous studies suggest that the interaction between
the effects of two flanker attributes critically depends on
the fact that these attributes are perceived as belonging
to the same object. Indeed, additive rather than interac-
tive effects have been found when the integration of the
spatial and nonspatial stimulus-irrelevant features was
hampered, for example, because they were conveyed by
two different objects (e.g., Stoffels & Van Der Molen, 1988).
If the two attributes are perceived as belonging to two
separate objects, there are just no prerequisites for the
interaction between their effects: The agreement or
disagreement between the responses signaled by two at-
tributes can affect performance only when these two sig-
nals come from the same source. Indeed, only when two
features are integrated, the consistency between them can
emerge as a new feature of the stimulus display, which, in
turn, reflects the way in which our brain segregates and
binds stimulus features, building meaningful and unitary
percepts in a coherent visual scene, starting from separate
feature representations (cf. Treisman, 1998). Accordingly,
no interaction should occur when flanker color is not
bound to flanker position, that is, when they are processed
separately. Thus, the additive effects observed in the con-
tralesional (unattended) hemispace, with faster corre-
sponding responses in both congruent and incongruent
conditions, suggest that feature binding does not occur
in this hemispace.
In summary, V.M.ʼs performance reveals that both spa-
tial and nonspatial flanker features were processed in
either the intact or neglected hemispace, but the type of
processing was different in the two hemispaces: Color
and position of ipsilesional (attended and consciously per-
ceived) stimuli appear to have been processed jointly,
whereas those of contralesional (neglected) stimuli seem
to have been processed as separate features. These results
suggest, therefore, that an important component of UN is
a deficit in binding simple features of contralesional stim-
uli into objects (see Van Vleet & Robertson, 2009; Cohen,
Ivry, Rafal, & Kohn, 1995), in particular, a deficit in in-
tegrating information concerning stimulus identity and
stimulus location (i.e., features processed by the ventral
and dorsal visual pathways; Robertson, 2004; Bailys, Gore,
Rodriguez, & Shisler, 2001; see also Deouell, 2002).
This proposal is based on the feature integration theory
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). According to this theory, sin-
gle features of unattended stimuli may be processed and
trigger responses in an automatic fashion. However, to
consciously recognize and voluntarily respond to the stim-
uli, stimulus features need to be bound together and form
integrated objects. Unbound object features cannot ac-
cess awareness. The binding process is mediated by at-
tention. When attention is either attracted away from an
object or prevented from being oriented toward an object
because of brain damage, object features are not bound
together, and the observer does not become aware of
them. Given that the representations of unattended ob-
jects are not tightly bound to the representation of their
locations, wrong combinations of features of different ob-
jects into one object or allochiric misallocation of such
objects toward the focus of attention can also occur in
either normal or brain-damaged observers (e.g., false
conjunctions in Balint patients or misallocation from the
contralesional to the ipsilesional hemispace in neglect
patients; Marcel et al., 2004). In this case, constituent fea-
tures of the unattended objects are bound to the attended
locus, and even if erroneously perceived as being in a lo-
cation different from that of their original sources, they
can access consciousness.
However, some caution should be used in drawing such
conclusions, as this account provides for a causal link
between attention and consciousness, whereas there is
evidence that conscious perception can occur without
attention (cf. van Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010; Koch &
Tsuchiya, 2007). Further research is needed to disentangle
the interaction between attentional processes, feature
binding, and conscious awareness: They undoubtedly
share an intimate relation, but the nature of this relation
is still not fully understood.
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Note
1. McIntosh et al. (2004) found that the trajectory of the reach-
ing movements of a right-brain-damaged patient was influenced
by the presence of contralesional, nonconsciously perceived ob-
jects. These results suggest that the spatial locations of such ob-
jects were implicitly coded and used to guide actions. In McIntosh
et al.ʼs study, however, the patient showed extinction rather than
UN (i.e., the patient only failed to detect a stimulus in the con-
tralesional hemispace when it was paired with a simultaneous
bilateral stimulus), and the spatial representations subserving
the patientʼs task (i.e., movement parameters to be specified in
the motor system with reference to the arm and hand positions)
were clearly different from the left–right spatial coding underlying
the spatial correspondence effect observed in the present study.
In addition, there was no evidence that stimulus features other
than the spatial ones (i.e., constituent stimulus features) were
processed by the patient in the contralesional hemispace. In this
respect, McIntosh et al.ʼs findings resemble the results of studies
with blindsight patients (cf. Cowey, 2010), except that, in McIntosh
et al.ʼs study, the absence of contralesional stimulus awareness
was the consequence of an attentional disorder rather than of
the deprivation of cortical visual input.
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